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Urban Public What the Future
Services: Holds
Robert Morris
Health and welfare are usually considered secondary or peripheral concerns of
modern society. The article considers how questions about the provision of social
welfare are imbedded in the economic, social, moral, and political fabric of con-
temporary America and New England. Underlying trends of economic, social,
and attitudinal change are outlined, and implications for the future are con-
sidered. The article also considers the role of universities in equipping the next
generation of citizens to cope more effectively with the complex issues that are
forcing a restructuring of urban services.
Beginning in 1975, a fifty-year trend in American public policy began to shift.
Political and public confidence in the ability of national government to
remedy innumerable social and economic ills began to weaken. A combination of
economic difficulties, budget deficits, and changed attitudes has produced not
only a resistance to increasing personal taxation but a more deep-seated question-
ing of the pattern of public services, particularly the publicly funded social,
health, and educational services, which account for about half of the federal
budget and between 12 to 18 percent of the GNP. Although such expenditures
provide basic protection against many of life's hazards—for example, illness,
unemployment, injury, and retirement—and significantly reduce the proportion of
the population living in poverty, many people now view the price tag as too high,
with cost outweighing perceived benefits.
New England, like other regions in the country, has not been immune to this
trend. The effect at both regional and national levels has been to restrict taxation
and to explore alternative strategies for resolving the insecurities of an industrial
economy. Private-sector arrangements are being examined as alternatives to
public programs; proprietary efforts to deliver medical, health, and social and
educational services are becoming popular.
These changes are not at the periphery of public life but at its center, for they
pertain to the most crucial insecurities of modern urban existence and to past
decisions involving about half of all governmental activity and a significant
percentage of business effort. More important, over half the services—and expen-
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ditures—are provided for citizens with middle-range incomes, and 80 percent of
the population is directly affected by them. Publicly funded programs are no
longer limited to the very poor, although the programs do raise 10 million people
to the level of the poverty line and help another 15 million to survive, albeit
below the poverty level. The standard of living of millions of middle-income
families is improved by tax deductions for mortgage and other consumption pay-
ments; these families are relieved of the necessity of providing for the financial
and health-care needs of aged parents; the health and the educational competence
of future generations, on whom the economy depends, is safeguarded. In sum, it
has been argued that the quality of life for all citizens depends on the continu-
ation of the aforementioned services.
Despite the benefits to our nation, efforts persist, since 1975, to effect reduc-
tions in all these programs and even to abolish some of them. 1 Other attempts 23
are being made to shift the cost of maintaining the programs back to individuals,
families, or local governments. Whatever the motivation for the change may be,
the structure of health-care and welfare services that was built up over the past
fifty years is in for a major overhaul. That overhaul will force a reevaluation of
the living conditions facing most citizens—not only the poor and "truly needy"
—
in the immediate future, as well as an examination of how these conditions can
be dealt with in ways that are consistent with our democratic ideals.
Basic Trends Affecting Future Development
There is widespread dissatisfaction with the results ofprograms that were evolved
over the past half-century, wholly apart from questions of cost or ideology. This
dissatisfaction is expressed across the entire spectrum of political opinion, from
right to left. In some measure, it is due to our twentieth-century belief that all
problems must have solutions, and short-term solutions at that. There is impa-
tience with the view that some events, like death, disablement, mental illness, or
economic dependency in cycles of boom and bust, still lie beyond our human
ability to control them. In part, the impatience stems from the size and complex-
ity of organizations that we have built on top of ad hoc and jerrybuilt policies,
organizations that are not responsive to human variety and that have become
nearly impossible to manage in a volatile political era. Whatever the cause, the
dissatisfaction joins together opponents and proponents of such programs in a
demand for change, but in divisive, opposing directions.
Our society has become increasingly self-regarding, with the highest value placed
on each individual's being free to realize his or her greatest potential through in-
dividual effort, and, even more important, to make individual choices about life-
style. These trends reinforce our basically individualistic culture. What is new is
that today, confidence has been eroded in the ability of any structure or frame-
work for collective effort through public means to provide the underpinning for
such individualism in an equitable fashion. We are taught to make our lives by
our own personal efforts, but there is little accompanying education about our
unavoidable interdependence or about obligations that we must fulfill toward one
another if society is not to splinter into a chaos of fragments. It is hard to see
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that our personal job success and our choices of life-style and our open, mobile
society have been made possible only by the collective efforts made through gov-
ernment, examples of which are tax subsidies enabling many businesses to stimu-
late production and the creation of jobs; public education, including technical
and professional training via universities; veterans' education benefits; special
education for the handicapped; diminution of discrimination on all grounds; and
minimum protection against the hazards of temporary unemployment or indus-
trial injury.
The question of why we have become more self-regarding is not easily an-
swered. Is it because of the historically individualist culture of the frontier? Or is
it the result of an educational and public media system that emphasizes this ap-
proach to modern society? Is it an essential ingredient in our definition of free-
24 dom? Or is it a human reaction to a period of uncertainty in the world, when all
of us prefer to protect ourselves and when our confidence in government has
been weakened by the imperfections of its arrangements? Has our confidence in
mutual aid been weakened by a long period of reliance on government that is
now viewed as unsatisfactory? We still talk about community, but the sinews and
muscle of community consist of interdependence to which we only pay lip ser-
vice; in reality we limit this interdependence to our families, our immediate circle
of friends and colleagues, and those individuals who are culturally and ethnically
like ourselves. "Community" seldom extends in our thinking beyond the people
we know and are familiar with. All others are strangers who lie outside our ma-
jor concerns.
Our ideas about dependency have changed. A considerable portion of our
health and social expenditures goes to make survival possible for that 15 and
sometimes 20 percent of our population that lacks independent means of support,
those "others" who are dependent on the rest of us for at least some of the time.
One of the inescapable facts of modern society is that some percentage of the
population will be unable to pay its own way through working simply because
work is not accessible at the time, place, and skill level appropriate to the depen-
dent able-bodied. Family care for the handicapped or for minors is further
limited by our economy's need for the mobile labor of mothers as well as of
husbands.
We face a major change in the nature and conception of dependency, a change
for which a long past of a different orientation has not equipped us. Historically,
western culture has a deep and charitable tradition of caring for its dependent in-
dividuals. This tradition was honored in ancient Israel, in classical Greece and
Rome, in early Catholic Church doctrine, in feudal societies, during the Renais-
sance, and in the nineteenth century of industrial capitalism. But in those times
the benefits of the tradition were concentrated on a few categories of clearly
helpless people: the aged, widows and orphans, sometimes the sick, and victims
of natural disasters visible to all. The dependent of today's society are different.
The widow is more likely to be a young unmarried mother with small children.
Minority youth are unable to attain work quickly enough, given the obstacles of
often inadequate education, race prejudices, and the inheritance of cultural dis-
crimination from the past. To these dependents have been added the able-bodied
victims of rapid technological change
—
youth and middle-aged workers whose
skills are rendered obsolete by new technology.
To make the picture more complex, we have a new type of aged individuals
who live longer than ever before and who are on average able-bodied, vigorous,
and better educated than their predecessors. These are not the decrepit or helpless
aged of the past, yet we have excluded them through forced retirement from
meaningful roles in society, while at the same time objecting to the social in-
surance tax burden imposed by their retirement. These elderly are unlikely, in the
aggregate, to remain long content with retirement and no clear role. Universities
have begun to offer some minor educational opportunities to this growing popu-
lation to add to its sense of self-satisfaction, but they have not yet considered
how to equip the elderly for their potential new roles.
Historically, the able-bodied never received much attention, for there was
always some work available to them. Today, our society creates conditions in
which work is either unavailable at the skill levels of the unemployed or, if it is 25
available, it is at a pay level that maintains poverty for some groups indefinitely,
without hope of escape. Jobs that offer the minimum wage with accompanying
deductions for insurance and for the cost of transportation to the workplace
guarantee continued poverty, especially for young female-headed families or low-
skill workers with large families.
Nationally, 7 to 8 percent of persons who seek work are without work. We
have come to accept this figure as "normal unemployment," whereas only a
dozen years ago the acceptable figure for this phenomenon was 3 to 4 percent. 2
Economists argue that economic growth plus technological and economic change
will in time produce enough jobs, or at least more of them. What this promise ig-
nores is that the creation of new jobs takes place over many years, during which
time human lives are wasted because there is no opportunity for productive par-
ticipation in society, as the popular attitude defines it. 3
To this 7 to 8 percent unemployed, we need to add those elderly who have
vigor and who wish to be active but whom we keep out of the action, and
those who have become discouraged and who have dropped out of the known
labor force. The sum total of unemployed is many millions of people, other-
wise able-bodied, who might be called the surplus people of the twentieth
century.
The traditionally accepted dependencies of disability are increasing, not de-
creasing, in number, despite the gains in medical science. We are encountering a
kind of failure of success. Our technology has reduced many hazards of disease,
but it has also created new life-extending technologies that are highly problem-
atical ethically and financially. For example, we have increased life expectancy
and can keep some catastrophically ill people alive: spinal cord injury cases,
stroke and some heart patients, end-state renal disease patients, and so forth. But
for some of these survivors the added span of life is only a year or two, with per-
petual medically invasive intervention at a cost of hundreds of thousands of
dollars per case. Some are rescued from an early death but require a lifetime of
care by others. We can save infants born with very low birth weights, a condition
often due to substance abuse or simple malnutrition of the mother, but between 6
and 19 percent of this group of infants who survive will face a lifetime of severe
disability, often neurological—the proportion of severely neurologically limited
children has doubled in the past twenty years. 4 At the other end of the life cycle,
the proportion of the population over seventy-five years of age is increasing rapidly.
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However, one out of every five people in this age group will succumb to a long-
extended disability. These individuals represent the classical cases of dependence
that we have been taught to provide for. Today, their numbers are increasing, al-
though we expected them to decline.
The costs of medical technology are increasing much more rapidly than the
GNP. Our commitment to such technology is stronger than ever, but access to it
is becoming more difficult except for either the quite well-to-do or through large
government subsidies, the use of which much current thinking resists.
Underpinning these trends is a continuing reluctance to increase our personal
expenditure for collective or cooperative efforts via taxation and government ac-
tion. The proportion of either American personal income or total GNP that is
siphoned away from personal use through taxation into collective use is low by
26 international comparisons; ours is about 20 to 30 percent, in contrast to 50 per-
cent in other countries with economies as healthy as our own. A recent survey
of philanthropic giving found that, in a seven-state region, a combination of
charitable giving via income-tax-claimed deductions, contributions to the United
Way, and corporation grants, when added together, still totaled less on a per-
capita basis than the historic tithing that religious practice has elicited for
centuries. 5
While such conflicting influences are at work, we have also undertaken to
replace, since 1935, concepts of charity for the underprivileged with concepts of
right and justice, including ideas of legal resource to secure remedy for ills in
place of the charitable impulses of philanthropists. Until the twentieth century,
most welfare activities were based on a long tradition of personal or charitable
giving to help the helpless. In the past one hundred years, an alternative con-
cept—that all citizens have certain enforceable claims they can make upon their
society—has slowly evolved. Initially the claims pertained only to protection of
one's person. But to these have been added enforceable claims that certain help-
less classes—the unemployed, the mentally ill, and so forth—can make based on
their special conditions of need. This recent transformation of a three-thousand-
year-old western tradition of personal and voluntary charity into a civic and
enforceable right has not yet penetrated deeply into the civic or public conscious-
ness. Old ideas of charity are still informing decisions made by voters even
though political choices have been presented in a new framework, and the result-
ing confusion is substantial.
The facts of demography exert a powerful influence as our nation becomes
more mature and its population grows older. But the simple increase in numbers
of the aged, along with a decline in the birthrate, means not only that our popu-
lation will be increasingly older, posing a challenge for our youth and energy-ori-
ented culture; the numbers (if not the proportions) in need of either medical care
or social supports because of enfeeblement will also increase. But the percentage
of workers whose employment can assure care will decrease. The so-called de-
pendency ratio—the number of persons needing support from those in the work
force vis-a-vis the total number in the work force—is expected to rise from one in
five to one in three. 6 Our economy may be able to produce enough goods with
less manpower, owing to automation, but the allocation of resources toward the
elderly—an intergenerational transfer of resources—will rise and may encounter
the tax resistance, already alluded to, of younger workers.
Moreover, the immigration of Hispanic and Asian populations has already
altered the social makeup of most cities, so that they are less homogeneous than
ever and are more like the eastern cities of the pre-World War I era, when a
massive immigration from southern and eastern Europe transformed urban life.
This new citizenry brings vitality and energy to the performance of many of the
tasks that native Americans reject, but it requires a greater investment for educa-
tion, acculturation, and training as it works its way into our culture.
Along with these varied trends, we can barely discern another, less easily artic-
ulated development. It can be variously identified as a loss of civil self-confi-
dence, as an anxiety about a world changing too rapidly for our comprehension,
or as an uncertainty about where we are heading. President Carter called it a na-
tional malaise, while President Reagan has tried to counter it by proclaiming that
all is well and that we are "on a roll." But deep doubts persist. Although we 27
lack conclusive evidence about the permanence, depth, or extent of the so-called
malaise, some of its contributory elements can be described as follows:
There is a notable lack of confidence about our economic future. Although we
are proud of our past record, we see other nations producing the goods we use
better and more cheaply than we can, while our own goods, although much in
demand, no longer are able to command world markets.
There is a fear that our children will have fewer economic opportunities than we
had. We dream of conquering space, but we may be witnessing a diminution of
more earthly dreams. Already, by one estimate, 7 the new economy has resulted in
about 40 percent of the middle-income class lowering their standard of living
throughout their working careers, although 60 percent have improved their position.
The prejudices of race still plague many people, and the demands of minorities
for a greater share in the available well-being or wealth are viewed as a threat
rather than as a realization of the democratic idea.
The overhanging concern about a nuclear holocaust, which has penetrated our
subconscious if not our daily thinking, goes hand in hand with our fears that a
competing economic order—that of socialism or communism—will threaten our
standards and our supremacy in the world.
Periodic recession and economic decline throw people out of work and into fun-
damental insecurity with increasing regularity.
The picture, however, is not all one-sided. There have been many positive achieve-
ments in science, the arts, and the economy. Moreover, we now have a very large
and dominant middle class or middle-income population, with only perhaps 15
percent of the population very poor and a small percentage extremely wealthy.
This represents a historic achievement. In the 1930s, 30 percent of the population
was very poor. In colonial America almost everyone was poor, although not
dependent. In early nineteenth-century England, 50 percent of the population was
poor. In classical Rome and Greece, 90 percent were poor. 8 The negative side of
this accomplishment is the existence of doubt among this large middle group as
to whether their gains are secure.
The complexities of modern society require public or collective action to deal
with the problems that change throws up. The measures we undertake to resolve
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these problems may not be the best or the most efficient, but provisions of some
kind against the insecurities and hazards of modern life are both required and ex-
pected by almost all citizens. This expectation has led us to invest much of our GNP
(about 18 percent) and much of our national and local governmental budgets (about
40 to 50 percent) for these purposes, so that health and welfare and other social-
protection measures are an integral part of our lives, not peripheral distractions.
Ultimately, the trends we have discussed will force our cities, our regions, and
the nation to confront numerous unpalatable choices amid contradictory wishes.
The public debate about such choices is muddied by multiform prejudices, mis-
conceptions, and misperceptions. The most serious of these is a conviction, now
held by many conservative thinkers, that the slowdown of the economy in the
past has been due to the generosity of our welfare programs, even though more
28 generous and less wealthy nations have not all experienced these same economic
problems. A recent analysis, however, finds that, at most, one percent of possible
GNP growth has been lost on account of social programs. 9
Another misconception is that the beneficiaries of welfare are living in un-
earned luxury. Unearned, perhaps, but hardly luxury. Those who are receiving
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) subsist on monthly incomes
that place them, at best, at 80 percent of the poverty level (when food stamps are
included) in only three of the richest states. For the other recipients of AFDC,
the level of real income ranges between 47 and 79 percent of the poverty level. 10
The result is that several million children—our next generation—not only live in
poverty but are at high risk of being malnourished and at risk of growing up per-
manently handicapped as well.
Finally, there is the misconception, already alluded to, that the costs of social
programs can be blamed on the lazy, able-bodied poor. In fact, 80 percent of our
social programs are provided to people without regard to their income, 11 which
means that we have evolved an unbalanced welfare system. We did this in the belief
that by making social benefits universal, the interests of all would safeguard the
programs from political attack. This hope, of course, did not contemplate the rela-
tive costs of a broad universal program attended by constant efforts to improve
benefits. Those costs have become too high for American voters or their politicians
to accept, especially since the trends noted earlier are reinforced by a fear of national
military insecurity, resulting in vastly increased investment in military programs.
The attempt at an imperfect and ill-conceived universalism has led to at least
45 percent of all social benefits going to citizens who live well above the poverty
line. 12 The provisions of our welfare structure, which is built upon retirement,
health benefits, and education, flow disproportionately to either the elderly or the
economically better-off. In the health field, our limited insurance provision on a
fee-for-service basis has meant that we spend twice as much money as a percent-
age of GNP to reach only half the proportion of the population that is serviced
by the British system at half the cost. (Canada also has a more universal health
system at a fraction of our cost.) Health protection is lacking for workers who
lose their jobs; in order to save money, the working poor are made ineligible for
Medicaid; and the protected aged, including the very poor aged, now pay half the
costs of their medical care.
The combination of such trends and public misperceptions has brought our
social programs to a crisis that will probably require some decades to overcome.
It is not possible to alter a system, no matter how badly conceived, in a few
months. Our country is too vast, our population too large and diverse, our pro-
grams too complex and unwieldy, and the multiplicity of special-group interests
that our individualistic society cherishes too extensive, for any change to be
brought about quickly. What lies ahead is an extended period of debate, confu-
sion, and frustration as quick solutions to massive and sometimes apparently in-
soluble problems are sought.
Is New England Different?
Current trends in welfare and social service programs exert as much influence in
contemporary New England as they do in the nation as a whole, but in a few
respects, New England differs from the national scene. Indeed, Massachusetts illus- 29
trates that the economic conditions of a region influence, but do not wholly gov-
ern, the evolution of social programs. Prior to the 1970s, New England as a whole
suffered from a contracting economy, but Massachusetts maintained a leadership
position with regard to social and health-care programs. Much of the state's legis-
lation was liberal and pace-setting; its level of generosity with public assistance
equaled that of more affluent areas, like New York and California. But with the
sharp economic changes of the seventies and early eighties, social programs were
cut back as tax constraint came to dominate political and public thinking.
Cuts in federal aid, which were reflected in state programs, resulted in a 10
percent reduction in maternal and children's health-care services, a 25 percent
reduction in mental health services, and a greater than 10 percent reduction in
other services. Medicaid, AFDC, and food stamps were cut between 10 and 24
percent, reducing the living standard for single-parent families and for low-
income workers and those left unemployed by economic change. 13
However, as soon as the Massachusetts economy began to recover through the
resurgence of its high-technology industries, and as its unemployment level dropped
to the lowest in the nation in 1984, the earlier trend toward the assumption of
public social responsibility resumed. The reemergence of state leadership in this
direction was visible in a new plan to contain escalating medical costs through the
control of hospital revenues from all sources, not just from Medicare and Medi-
caid (the federally authorized and financed health programs for the retired and
the poor only); additional appropriations to help hospitals offset the reductions
in federal aid; an increase in home-care services for the elderly to reduce admis-
sions to nursing homes; the introduction of new programs for the care of persons
suffering from Alzheimer's disease; the use of the state public welfare authority
to restore pre- and postnatal medical care for poor, pregnant mothers; and, in
1985, authorized increases in public assistance benefits to raise the income of all
recipients of aid to the state poverty level.
New England differs from the national scene in other respects as well: First, it
was settled earliest and has an older physical infrastructure. It also has an older
population, as measured by the proportion of elders. Perhaps it differs most—at
least in Boston and Massachusetts as a whole—through the presence of two major
"industries": higher education and acute medical care. The medical system is
heavily endowed with teaching medical centers whose reputation is worldwide;
thus, a considerable proportion of state resources are funneled into acute, high-
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technology, high-cost medical care, which also affects decisions that have to be
made about other aspects of the economy. The current trends in the national
economy and the welfare structure will, accordingly, be especially difficult for
Massachusetts to adjust to.
The Potential Role of Universities
During the next twenty years, the character and adequacy of our local communi-
ties as well as of our national society will be shaped in a significant degree by
how we handle the social welfare needs of our complex population as it faces
these even more complex times. What citizens and leaders are all confronting is a
redefinition or reaffirmation of the kind of society we want to have. Will it be a
30 society of community sharing and cooperation, or one of sharply antagonistic
classes? Will it be a community riven by insecurity or one that is able to go about
the necessary tasks of the day with a reasonable sense of security concerning the
unpredictable hazards of change and of life? Will our insecurities be borne by
each of us singly, or can we cooperate to achieve an adequate degree of security
both singly and collectively? If we go at it individually, then class divisions and
inequities are bound to increase. If we approach our problems collectively, we
will have some choices about how best to proceed. There is the risk that collec-
tive effort may produce authoritarian government. But equally, such effort can
produce more equity and stability. It is possible to make choices that will bring
about the latter outcome. The financial costs of various alternatives and their dif-
fering benefits have not yet been accounted for.
Many institutions will be engaged in this struggle to confront the future: busi-
ness and industrial groups; civic groups like the League of Women Voters;
churches; political parties; the bureaucracies of government and nongovern-
mental organizations alike; and unions. Universities can play a leading role in
the resolution of problems in the welfare and social services systems if they so
choose; what is required as a prerequisite to their involvement is a redefinition
of the traditional functions of the university. The scope of these functions needs
to be expanded to permit universities to inform upcoming generations about the
realities of the world we are living in and the world we are moving toward. We
may not know what the outcome will be, but we can learn more and teach more
about how the tides of change are affecting us, even if we are unsure where they
are leading us. Some universities have made a start in this direction, mainly by
adding professional schools of many kinds: medicine, law, nursing, social work.
But these schools are, today, mainly centers for teaching techniques that will
enable students to make a private career for themselves. The rest of the univer-
sity, with its arts and sciences and humanities, has barely been aware of the
challenge and of how the humanities and social sciences, through education, can
contribute constructively not only to understanding the problems but also to
social, organizational, or social policy construction.
The Social Contract Revised
Since 1935, the United States has operated under an implicit, and sometimes ex-
plicit, contract about the sharing of responsibilities between national government,
local governments, families, and philanthropy. 14 In a process that was quite unin-
tended, this contract evolved over the past fifty years in such a way that most ef-
fort to deal with human needs was directed toward the national government in
the form of requests for financial help and sometimes for leadership. Beginning
with a basic national commitment to protect the unemployed and the aged
through Social Security, unemployment insurance, AFDC, and general relief
(later augmented by Supplementary Security Income as a catch-all safety net for
those outside the labor force), the tendency has been to seek federal intervention
to deal with the educational problems of all children and the developmentally dis-
abled, to treat or care for the mentally ill and the retarded, to underwrite the
rehabilitation of the seriously disabled, to overcome racial discrimination, to
assure medical care for the poor, and to serve numerous people experiencing a
variety of human difficulties, including drug and alcohol abuse. 31
At the same time, there grew up a previously unrecognized, second component
of welfare, which is provided through the employment benefit programs of in-
dustry and which now reaches about half of all employed persons, mainly those
in large corporations.
Nonprofit philanthropic agencies have barely kept up their share of the con-
tract through voluntary contributions, but they do much of the necessary work
through the use of tax dollars.
We have also come to understand that a third major part of the contract is
carried out through what are called tax expenditures—that is, benefits provided
to individuals through the income tax system which are as good as direct public
payments but are made up of taxes not paid on account of interest deductions
for buying goods, home purchase, and exemptions for capital savings.
Well over half the total cost of government social and welfare programs,
employee benefits, and the work of philanthropic institutions goes to benefit
citizens who are not needy, but the blame for the cost is placed, in ignorance, on
those who are poor. The system is extremely distorted, unfair, and unbalanced.
By far the greatest share of benefits goes either for retirement or medical care for
those over sixty years of age, to employees of large, unionized corporations
mainly for acute medical and hospital benefits and retirement, or to the financing
of middle-class purchases. A little known aspect of the distortion is that military,
congressional, presidential, and other civil service employees have medical and
retirement benefit programs that are much more generous than those that are
provided for anyone else.
As a result of its imbalance, this security system has very large holes in it.
Able-bodied adults, especially those in female-headed families where there are
small children, are protected at levels far below the poverty line established as a
national guide, which means that millions of children live in hunger and risk
malnutrition. Workers in small businesses lack corporate benefit schemes. Other
workers with benefits, if they become unemployed, are likely to lose medical
benefits altogether, may lose retirement benefits already earned, and lose unem-
ployment protection if out of work for a year. The Reagan Administration has
enlarged the holes in the system regarding the able-bodied adult.
The social welfare system is entering another period of transition, or revision,
because of attempts to reconcile these present distortions with the trends already
discussed. Following are some questions to be answered by all citizens.
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Can we produce an effective social protection system if we reduce government
commitment in absolute and percentage terms? In the face of such a reduction,
could we have an equitable social system consistent with our moral and demo-
cratic aspirations?
If we cannot reduce the fiscal obligation of government, would we be better
off spending the money through proprietary or through philanthropic agencies?
The current trendy phrase to describe the first alternative is "privatization" of
public expenditure. It is widely asserted that private business can run hospitals,
prisons, and welfare agencies better than anyone else, and more cheaply as well.
Some responses to this claim are still debatable, but a few of them recur consis-
tently. Proprietary social or health services achieve an outward appearance of ef-
ficiency by avoiding high-cost patients or clients, by limiting those they will serve,
32 by dropping services that are not profitable even if those services are needed, and
generally by not taking on the most costly and difficult problems. The one excep-
tion to this pattern may be with certain high-technology services like organ
transplants, which will be paid for by enough wealthy patients, if not by govern-
ment. 15 Privately run services are effective in introducing more businesslike proce-
dures and are especially skilled at operating in the black within a limited income.
Their accounting expertise enables them to increase income through timely billing
to government or to insurance companies and through follow-up of bad debts.
On a fully controlled unit cost basis, plus a cost benefits comparison, however,
the outlook for privatization is at best dubious. It will work under some condi-
tions and for some classes, but not for all. It will not work if equity and ade-
quate access for all are valued criteria. It is necessary to recall only that in the
nineteenth century, when a large portion of the welfare system in the United
States was carried by proprietary agencies, such extensive abuses resulted that
public action became essential to redress them.
A related form of privatization is reliance upon individual insurance through
employee benefits as a means of insuring against risk. This procedure warrants
substantial attention, as long as its limitations are recognized. We do not know
whether the mandate that all employers, even those with as few as three
employees, must set up benefit systems would prove economical, or whether such
a requirement would burden already overburdened small businesses with paper-
work. We do not know what the costs of such a system through private employ-
ers would be, although Germany has such a model. Neither do we yet know
whether such a scheme would prove equitable, given that benefits supplied by a
highly profitable defense industry fueled by government contracts would be pitted
against those provided by a small dry cleaning or grocery chain. Despite the ques-
tions that have been raised, there is room to consider a different role for the pro-
prietary sector.
How will private philanthropy fit into the new social contract? There are no
signs that the rate of philanthropic giving has risen or will rise dramatically, and
it has represented less than 4 percent of all social expenditures since 1935. But
such agencies could compete better with proprietary agencies in their business
procedures than they do now, even though, like private business, they cannot
underwrite high-cost services for a poor population. Philanthropic agencies have
handicaps that must be overcome if they are to rival the capacities of private
business. They lack capital reserves, which proprietary firms can obtain through
selling stocks; third-party payments to such agencies do not permit them to in-
clude capital start-up costs in their reimbursement plans the way profit-making
firms can; and generally, the salary levels in philanthropic organizations are also
lower than in profit-making concerns, so that their capacity to attract staff is
more limited.
What are the moral and economic aspects of providing for the able-bodied
adult in this new world? Murray 16 and some others argue that all financial security
should be abolished by government, that such help positively injures its recipi-
ents. Most analysts point out that there is no evidence to justify either the action
or the conclusion. 17 This is more a matter of how social programs are designed to
do the least harm, but some argue that there is no cooperative responsibility for
the needy except in the family. So moral choices are posed about citizens' obliga-
tion to strangers and the claims the deprived are entitled to make on society. 33
There are also specifically economic issues to confront. We need to decide
whether a high level of financial security for the able-bodied is a disincentive to
work, and whether it undermines our economy in competition abroad and at
home. The evidence for such beliefs is very sparse, even though it is daily as-
serted that we are weakened by our welfare programs. International comparisons
contradict the media explanation and recent economic analyses indicate that there
is little merit to these claims. Both Lampman and Bawden conclude that at most
we may lose one percent in GNP growth because of welfare programs of all
kinds, including those for the helpless and disabled. 18 Some marginal evidence in-
dicates that there is a slight disincentive to work more as income improves. This
is a human reaction for all classes, not just the poor. On the other hand, a great
deal of evidence indicates that for those with no income whatsoever, social pro-
grams do not at all serve as a deterrent to seeking work. In fact, beneficiaries of
such programs flood in to work when it is available, and even the least employ-
able—mothers of small children
—
prefer work to relief //there is work at all, //
they have skills, and //their minor children can be well looked after. 19
The question of whether to provide security for the able-bodied more than
touches on morality; it poses vital moral questions: What kind of society do we
envision for ourselves? Are the able-bodied to be treated as the beggars of pre-
poor law England of 1601? Or do we believe that all human beings are entitled to
some basic security, as long as they function as members of a community—that
is, as long as they look for and take work when it is available? Given the past
fifty years of experience, during which the absence of work opportunity has af-
fected anywhere from 3 to 30 percent of the population in a roller coaster of eco-
nomic ups and downs, can we believe that even a relatively stable community
assures all its members of the minimum requirements for existence? The belief is
now held by some that each person should secure protection for him/herself,
rather than seek it jointly with others through government. Will actions based on
this belief lead to the kind of society we want or not? Part of the answer depends
on whether we believe that there are jobs for all if they would but look, or that
there are not enough jobs for all able-bodied at all times or at any one time.
How shall we shape the federal role for welfare? The path of the new federalism
scales down the national government's financial, administrative, and regulatory
responsibilities in all areas except defense and the military, and turns the burden of
most welfare back onto the states or onto private business. The question, in the
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end, may be answered by how much federal revenue should be appropriated,
even if the revenues are administered by the states with no federal control. There
is much worth in the thesis that a nation as varied as ours would be served better
through greater decentralization of the federal government and through other
kinds of organized effort to reduce the costs and complexities involved in trying
to run the preponderance of the welfare program by means of the vast bureauc-
racy in Washington. There is also much worth in exploring the notion that states
can compete with each other as laboratories for innovation and invention in the
social arena. The price for such diversity, however, may be a return to great in-
equities among the states, with poor people in poor states suffering at a level not
morally justifiable while wealthy states have little poverty and ample resources.
The underlying question is whether we see ourselves as one nation, in the same
34 way as we hope to experience ourselves in a local community, or whether we
choose to be a federation of independent localities fighting each other.
A basic constitutional question is embedded in this welfare issue: Should a
one-hundred-and-fifty-year trend toward a strong central government be reversed,
leading to a federation of powerful states? The last time this question was faced,
we suffered a catastrophic civil war.
Another aspect of the social contract has to do with the family. During the
past fifty years, families have slowly been relieved of some of their burdens and
provided with certain benefits: help with medical costs, provision of basic in-
come, and housing for aged parents; the cost of primary education for children
and part of the cost of higher education for young adults; and care of some
severely disabled, especially the elderly or the mentally retarded. Until 1980 we
raised half the poor families, and most of the aged poor, above the poverty
level. We have improved nutrition for poor children, enabling them to become
healthier adults. For families with some means, this has meant that more of
their income was released to improve the education of their older children and
to raise the standard of living for the entire family. In the next period of our
history, should families with means reassume more of these social costs? Should
they pay more for their children's education, for their own housing and medical
care, and so on? Should they, in effect, reduce their own standard of living? We
have begun on this course by increasing the share that families must pay for
higher education and the amounts that individuals must pay for medical care
above and beyond their insurance protection. For the aged the additional cost of
health care has risen from 20 to 44 percent of their medical bills. 20 And we have
begun to tax retirement benefits for individuals whose total income exceeds
$25,000.
There are issues of income redistribution and social justice to be settled. All
welfare involves some redistribution of wealth, but the adjustment to date has
been minor. The shares of national income held by the top 5 percent of wealth
holders dropped by one percent to 44.5 percent, and for the lowest 5 percent, it
rose by .4 percent to 3.9 percent between 1947 and 1975. 21 Even without facing
any demand for equality of income, the issue of whether the present distribution
is fair will persist; and if we are to retain our present economic system basically
as is, the use of welfare as a means of narrowing the gap between the wealthy
and the poor may be in the interest of revitalizing a sense of community and
avoiding internal conflict. Between 1969 and 1979 median family income dropped,
after inflation and taxes were factored in. Since 1983 there has been some increase
in median family income, but the increase has been small compared to the large
numbers of individual fortunes created through the combination of an economic
boom and tax cuts for the well-off. The disparity between upper- and lower-income
groups seems to be on the rise after some fifty years of its being reduced by
public policy.
Finally, a less global welfare issue pertains, but one with powerful ethical ram-
ifications. How much difference among people, other than in terms of income,
can we tolerate? We have tried to return to the mainstream of community life the
mentally retarded, the mildly mentally ill, and youthful delinquents. These efforts
are now being resisted by ordinary citizens, who object to having such persons
live in their neighborhoods either because of personal antipathy or fear or antici-
pation of depressed property values. Whatever the explanations, a major welfare 35
debate of the next decade will center on the question of whether we will segregate
those who are different from most of us. The impulse to segregate is seen also in
the pervasive fear of minorities and in the choice of location for clusters of low-
cost housing for the poor elderly. There will always be differentiation in residence
because of differences in economic class and culture, but is our desire—or need
—
to live only with people who are just like ourselves so strong that we must isolate
all who differ?
Conclusion
There is no convenient way to terminate this brief review of the complex and
emotional issues that attach themselves to the welfare debate. It may have be-
come clear that what once were minor issues concerning welfare now involve and
pertain to all that matters: the very nature of our communities and our society;
the basic ethical and philosophical questions about human relationships; and a
large part of our economic life as well. If universities are to equip the youth of
our nation to deal with such serious matters when they become mature citizens
and must make choices about them, then the health and welfare services provide
a tangible basis on which the scholarship of the academy and the realities of daily
living can be joined. The result of such a union could be an electorate motivated
to make democratic decisions with less prejudice, as well as an enhanced founda-
tion in scientific knowledge about the world we are remaking. Universities have
long been laboratories for scientific invention and discovery. Perhaps they can
finally become equally effective laboratories for invention and discovery in the
realms of human and social organization. Irving Howe has recently reminded us
that Ralph Waldo Emerson was once viewed as a prophet of unseizable oppor-
tunities in a youthful American democracy. 22 Will we seize some of the oppor-
tunities that a more grown-up democracy affords?
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